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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the State of Utah

WINSLOW C. COLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Vs.
MARGUERITE D. COLE,

Case No.

7717

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT

In addition to the facts presented by Appellant, certain
other facts, as appear from the various Findings and Decrees; which make up the record, are pertinent to the issues
in this case.

~

__ ...

--- --·--
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After having been married to the Plaintiff for a comparatively short time, the Defendant, on or about the 24th day
of July, 1931, in disregard to the solemnity of her marriage
vows, wilfully and without cause, and against the wish and
will of the Plaintiff, and without his consent, deserted and
abandoned the Plaintiff, and that at all times between the
24th day of July, 1931, and the 19th day of May, 1936, th'!
Defendant did so continue to wilfully and without cause desert and abandon the Plaintiff, and to live separate and apart
from him; without any sufficient cause, and against his
wish, and without his consent.
That there were no children born the issue of said marriage, so that the alimony awarded was not for the support,
and education and maintenance of a minor child.
That despite the fact that the divorce was granted solely
because of the fault of the Defendant, the Court, nevertheless, allowed her a full one-half (1-2) of the community
property, and in addition required that the Defendant repay to her the sul'll: of $1,323.00, which represented the am·
ount the Plaintiff had borrowed from the Defendant during their married life. In addition, the Defendant was awarded a total of $720.00 in alimony, payable at the rate of
$60.00 per month; commencing June 1, 1936, and the sum
of $360.00, payable at the rate of $30.00 per month; commencing June 1, 1937. The record discloses that all of these
sums have been fully paid.
The further fact is evident that the application for modification was made more than fourteen (14) years after the
2
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date of the entry of the Decree, and tha! the Plaintiff i-:;
now of the age of sixty-two (62) years; is married; has a
son, age 11 and a daughter, age 10, depending on him for
support.
That at the time the Decree was entered, the Plaintiff received a yearly income, as Sevier River Commissioner, of $2,250.00. That now he receives, as such River
Commissioner, a salary of $350.00 per month, and that his
employment is on a yearly basis. That in addition, he receives approximately $900.00 per year, net income, in the
farm property.
In the present proceedings, the Court found that the right
to permanent alimony, on the part of the Defendant, was
fully adjudicated in the original divorce proceedings, and
that the matter should not be reopened in this hearing.
(Paragraph VII Findings of Fact on Petition for Modification of Divorce Decree.)
ARGUMENT
Defendant and Appellant listed three (3) points for reversal, as follows :
POINT NO. I. The trial court erred in holding that the
original Decree finally adjudicated the right of
the right of the Defendant to alimony. The express
language of the Decree reserved jurisdiction for
a subsequent determination of alimony.
POINT NO. II. The trial court erred in holding that whe3
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ther an award of alimony would seem just and
equitable ~o the present dependents of the Plaintiff was a legal ground to be considered in making
an award.
POINT NO. III. The findings of fact of the court show
that a substantial change in the material circumstances of the Plaintiff and Defendant had taken
place justifying an award of alimony as prayec!,
and the decision of the court that the evidence
did not justify an order for alimony was contrary to the undisputed facts and to the courts own
findings.
Each of these Points will be treated in the order given.
DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S FIRST POINT
It is true, as stated by counsel in their Brief, that the
Plaintiff Respondent in question did not raise the question
with respect to the right of the Defendant to receive
an award of alimony, as granted under the original Decree.
Had the question been raised ,it would have not made any
difference, one way or the other, since the amount awarded
in the original Decree was actually paid, and there is no
way that it could have been recovered from the Defendant
Appellant.
In their argument on this point, counsel for Defendant
Appellant are entirely overlooking the issue in this case,
and that question is: If the right to permanent alimony
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was put in issue fully and adjudicated adversely in the
original proceedings, may the former wife in a later proceedings, more than fourteen (14) years after, seek a
Modification of the Decree, so as to award her permanent
alimony, after the same was denied in the original findings?
We believe that this question is fully settled in the case
of Cody vs. Cody, 47 Ut. 556, 154 Pac. 952; Hamilton vs.
Hamilton, 89 Ut. 554, 58 Pac. 2d. 11.
Justice Frick in the case of Cody vs. Cody, supra, set
forth this rule in very concise language. Quoting from
page 957 of the Pacific Reporter, as follows:
"I know there are authorities which hold that a final
judgment for alimony in gross is, even after the
judgment becomes irreversivle, subject to modification on averments and proof of changed conditions
and circumstances. But I believe the better rule and
weight of authority to be against such a holding.
The cases bearing on the question may be found in
7 Standard Ency. of Procedure, 842; 17 Century Digest, Diveorce, Sec. 692; 7 Decennial Digest, Divorce,
Sec. 245; 2 Nelson on Divorce, Sees. 933a and 934.
Except dicta stated in them, there is nothing in
Read v. Read, 28 Utah, 297, 78 Pac. 675, or Buzzo v.
Buzzo, 148 Pac. 362, to make against this. If an order allowing alimony in gross, or specific property
in lieu of all rights in and to the husband's property,
is final and res ajudicata, and not open to modification, except upon averments and proof of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in procuring the order,
for just as congent reasons do I think an ajudication
upon issues and evidence awarding no alimony is
J1kewise final and set at rest, and not subject to modification, except on averments and proof of fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation in proucring it."
The rule as laid down in the above cases has never been

5
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modified by the Laws of the State of Utah.
The cases of Doe vs. Doe, 48 Ut. 200, 158 Pac. 781, and
Schuster vs. Schuster, 88 Ut. 257, 53 Pac. 2d. 428, cited by
counsel, have no bearing on this case, as the facts and cir··
cumstances in each case are entirely different. Those cases
merely held that the misconduct of the wife alone was not
sufficient grounds for the denial of alimony to her, if the
facts and circumstances of the particular case justified it.
The case of Alldridge v.s. Alldridge, 229 Pac. 2d., 681 ....... .
........ Ut ................. , cited by counsel, has no bearing on the
present case. The Alldridge case merely held that under th~
fa.cts and circumstances of that particular case, the Court
abused its discretion in denying permanent alimony. The
Alldridge case was a direct appeal from the original Order
denying alimony in the Decree of Divorce.
We have no quarrel with the rule of law, that under certain circumstances a wife may be entitled to alimony, even
though it is her fault that the marriage failed. The rule is
well-stated in 1 R.C.L. Sec. 83, page 936 of the volume as
follows:
"83. Divorce Granted for Wife's Fault. - According
to the rule of the common law, where a divorce was
granted for the misconduct of the wife, she was not
entitled to alimony. This was productive of so much
hardship, ho_wever, and so frequently left her a prey
to starvation or a life of shame, especially where
her own property had become vested in her husband
by reason of the marriage, that statutes have been
enacted in England and a number in the United
States authorizing the courts to make such an allowance of alimony in favor of a guilty wife as the
surrounding circumstances may justify. In some in6
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stances, although not allowed in express terms, the
language of the statute is sufficiently broad to grant
by Implication such authority. Obviously she is never
entitled to it as a matter of course, and it is entirely
discretionary with the court to allow her uch alimony as ,under the circumstances, is reasonable, just,
and right, taking into consideration the amount of
the husband's property, and the extent to which she
contributed to the accumulation thereof, the ability
of each to earn money in the future, and their conduct in the past. The allowance is based not so much
on the obligation to support, which has been terminated, as on what would be a just division of the
community property, taking into consideration the
extent to which the wife assisted in its accumulation.
If there are not mitigating circumstances and it
would be inequitable to award her permanent alimony, none should be decreed. Thus where she is
solely to blame, and neither brought property to her
husband on marriage nor thereafter contributed to
its acquisition by her industry and thrift, she is not
entitled to an allowance of alimony. But where property has been jointly acquired largely through her
efforts, alimony should be awarded even though her
conduct has been highly improper, especially where
the husband himself has not been entirely free from
blame. In a few jurisdictions, however, the law forbids the award of alimony where the divorce has
been decreed because of the wife's adultery."
The grounds of the Modification of the Decree of Divorce, with respect to alimony, in 1 R.C.L., Alimony, Sec.
94, at page 948, are as follows:
"94. Grounds for Modification. - The application for
an alteration or modification of the decree is always
addressed to the judicial discretion of the chancellor,
and ordinarily, in the absence of fraud in its procurement, the only inquiry is whether sufficient
cause has intervened since the decree to authorize
or require the court, applying equitable rules and
principles, to change the allowance. Authority to

7
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modify the allowance, however, does not include the
right to alter the award upon the state of case existing when the decree was entered, or to review the
action of the chancellor therein. The parties had
th~ir day in court, with the right of appeal if the
decree was deemed erroneous, and it cannot be supposed that is was intended that the court should
sit in review of its own decree, or that the same or
some succeeding chancellor presiding in the same
court should, after the lapse of indefinate time,
have power to reverse, alter, or modify a decree for
alimony upon the facts existing at the time of its
entry. After divorce, a husband should be free to
act in reliance on the finality of the award determining the extent of his obligation, -----------------------------· _
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------· As an allowance of alimony in gross is in full discharge and
satisfaction for all claim for future support of the
wife, it cannot be subsequently altered, for the power of modification is not applicable ·under such
circumstances, though the contrary has been held in
at least one jurisdiction."
DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S SECOND POINT
There is absolutely no merit to Defendant Appellant's
contention that the present dependents of the Plaintiff Respondent cannot be taken into consideration in an application
for modification of a decree awarding alimony. This rule
is clearly stated in 27 C.J .S. at page 995 under the subtitle, "Remarriage of Husband", as folllows:
"The remarriage of the husband to another does
not preclude modification of the amount of alimony
decreed to his wife. On the contrary, such remarriage is a circumstance to be considered on an application for modification, and may warrant a reduction to enable him to fulfill his obligation to
support his second wife and his children by his
second wife."
8
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Counsel cites the annotations contained in 30 A.L.R. 79;
64 A. L. R. 1269, and 12 A. L. R. 246, as supporting their
contention that a remarriage and contraction of new obligations does not constitute a fact to be considered in an application for modification of the divorce decree, with respect to alimony, is not born out by the annotations cited
in those cases.
Typical of the cases cited under the annotation of 30
A.L.R., at pages 80 and 81, are the following two cases:
"Thus, in Buckminster v. Buckminster, (1865) 38
Vt. 248, 88 Am. Dec. 652, where additional alimony
was refused on the application of the divorced wife,
some of the grounds stated where that the husband
had remarried and had children by his second wife,
which were young; that what property he had, had
been acquired since his second marriage; and that
he was getting old. The court said that as a matter
of sound policy, where husband and wife are divorced, the wife should not be encouraged to think
she has a continuing lien on her divorced husband
for support, but that, on the contrary, the divorce
and decree of alimony should be understood, as between them. to end their relations and obligations to
each other."
"In Berrett v. Berrett (1914) 80 Wash. 474, 141 Pac.
1158, the court recognized the rule down in State
ex rei. Brown v. Brown (1903) 31 Wash. 397, 62 L.R.
A. 974, 72 Pac. 86, that a husband is bound to pay
alimony to a former wife, notwithstanding the fact
that he has remarried, but said that the court had
never intended to go so far as to hold that a divorced
all his earnings must go to his first wife, and reversed an order increasing the alimony of the first wife
person has no right to remarry, or that, if he does,
where the circumstances made such increase inequitable."
9
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One of the most fundamental principles involved in :t
matter of this kind concerns the obligation of a husband to
support his wife. That obligation is terminated the moment
that a wife deserts her husband, without cause. This matter
is thoroughly annotated at 6 A.L.R. 9. The rule is also
amply stated in the case of Nelson v. Nelson, decided in
the Supreme Court of Utah in 1919, and reported in 182 Pac.
at page 386. Therefore, when the Defendant deserted -::he
Plaintiff on the 24th day of July, 1931, without his consent;
wilfully, and without case, and against the will and wish
of the Plaintiff, the obligation to support her, then and
there, ceased. Any obligation after that date to pay the
Defendant anything on the part of the Defendant, must
arise out of the terms and conditions of the Decree of Divorce, the obligation to support having been terminated.
Then the property rights, whether in the form of alimony,
or otherwise, would have to be determined on what would
be a just division o fthe community property, taking into
consideration the extent to which the wife had assisted in
its accumulation. Under the general rule, where the wife
is solely to blame and neither brought property to her husband on marriage, or thereafter contributed to its acquisition by her industry and thrift, she is not entitled to alimony. In he present case, the facts disclose that any property, which the wife paid to the husband at the time of the
marriage, was repaid in full, and that in addition, she received one-half (1-2) of the full value of the property of the
husband, as well as a settlement of alimony in gross, even
though the same were payable in installments. Under the
facts and circumstances of the case, this certainly fulfilled
the full obligation of the Plaintiff to his former wife.

10
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In addition, the matter of alimony, as well as any rule
for modification for an order of alimony, rests in the
sound discretion of the court, and in the absence of the
clear abuse of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will
not be disturbed on appeal. This matter is clearly stated in
27 C.J .S. at pages 1107 to 1109, under sub-section C of section 288, in the following language :
"Discretionary orders as to alimony or allowances
in divorce actions are reviewable, but unless the
trial court has abused its discretion, the appellate
court will not disturb a decision as to temporary
alimony, permanent alimony, modification of alimony, or counsel fees and expenses."
A like rule is stated in 1 R.C.L., at page 929, in the following manner:
"77. Amount of Allowance. - The determination of
the amount of permanent alimony is controlled by
no fixed standard, but rests rather, in the sound
discretion of the court."
In addition, there is a presumption of the correctness
of the order. The rule in that respect being stated in 27
C.J .S. at page 1110, in the following language:
"The general rule is that every intendment will
be made in favor of the order appealed from. It
will be presumed that the proper procedural steps
were taken, that the court acted after due consideration, that the court considered all the evidence
to warrant the court's findings or order, particularly
where the record does not contain the evidence."
The same rule is supported by the Utah cases. Particularly
11
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the case of Read v. Read, 28 Ut. 297 78 Pac. 673, was quoted
and approved in the case of Blair v. Blair, 40 Ut. 306 121
Pac. 19; at page 21 of the Pacific Recorder, as follows:
"The awarding of alimony and fixing the amount
thereof are questions the determination of which
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court;
and, unless it is made to appear that there has been
an abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
dealing with one or both of these questions, its
judgment and orders granting and fixing the alimony will not be disturbed."
The Blair case also lays down clearly the rules by which
alimony is determined. In the Blair case, the Court, after
quoting the general rules with respect to the determination
of the amount of alimony, went on to say:
"To the foregoing statement we can add nothing
except to say that the courts, under certain circumstances, may also take into consideration the character of the husband's property; that is, whether it
is productive or not, and whether the wife has assisted him in its accumulation or otherwise."
The trial court, in his discretion, found that it would
be unjust and inequitable to make an Order requiring the
Plaintiff, who is sixty-two (62) years of age, to contribute
to the support of a former wife, who was divorced from
him because of her desertion more than fourteen (14) years
prior to her application for modification of the Decree. Such
an order was not an abuse of discretion. Had the rule of the
Court been that the Plaintiff be required, at this time, to
contribute to the support of his former wife, under the facts
and circumstances as disclosed by the record, such an order
12
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would have been, clearly, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to public policy.
DEFENDANT APPELLANT'S THIRD POINT
The is nothing disclosed in the record as to the changed
condition of the parties, which would now require the
Plaintiff to pay Defendant additional alimony, if there
were no other circumstances affecting her right thereto.
It has been shown under the facts and circumstances of
this case that the Defendant is not entitled to alimony
for her support at this time, and the changed conditions of
the parties are not such as would justify such support.
It is true that the Defendant now finds herself in distressing circumstances, but none of this is the fault of th~
Plaintiff. Furthermore, the alleged improvement in the
condition of the Plaintiff actually is not very great. In
fact, he is less able to respond in alimony than he was at
the time the Decree was entered. The Court must, of necessity, know of th increased Federal and State taxes that are
levied against the income of an individual, and must know
of the decline in the purchasing power of the dollar, so
that it is now extremely doubtful whether a salary of $350.00
per month, which is the amount of the salary now received
by the Plaintiff, would come as near providing a living as
the salary of $187.50,. which he received at the time the
divorce was granted. The Court found that the Plaintiff
has farming lands and water stock of the value of $37,857.00,
but the net income therefrom is only $900.00 per year. In
addition, the Plaintiff is now more than sixty-two (62)
years of age; is soon approaching the age when he will be
13
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forced into retirement, and will no longer receive the
salary, which he is now receiving. Under these circumstances, to take from him the small accumulation of property, which he has acquired without the help or assistance
from his former wife, and deprive his present wife, who
has assisted in the acquirement of this property, of her
just support, and deprive his minor children of the necessities of life in order to award the same to a former wife,
who lived with the Plaintiff but a short time, and then
deserted him without cause, and at the time of the divorce
received a full one-half (1-2) of the property acquired during the marriage, would constitute a situation, which would
shock the conscience of any fair-minded person. If anyone
is required to seek public assistance under the Welfare
Laws of the State of Utah for support, it should be the former wife, who was the guilty party, and not the present wife
and children of the Plaintiff, or the Plaintiff himself.
The Plaintiff submits that the order of the trial court,
refusing the Petition of the Defendant for mo~ification
of the Decree of Divorce, should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
DUDLEY CRAFTS,
Attorney for Plaintiff
~nd

Respondent.
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